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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a systematic analysis of the Twitter discussion on the 2016 Austrian presidential
elections. In particular, we extracted and analyzed a data-set consisting of 343645 Twitter messages related
to the 2016 Austrian presidential elections. Our analysis combines methods from network science, sentiment
analysis, as well as bot detection. Among other things, we found that: a) the winner of the election
(Alexander Van der Bellen) was considerably more popular and influential on Twitter than his opponent, b)
the Twitter followers of Van der Bellen substantially participated in the spread of misinformation about him,
c) there was a clear polarization in terms of the sentiments spread by Twitter followers of the two presidential
candidates, d) the in-degree and out-degree distributions of the underlying communication network are
heavy-tailed, and e) compared to other recent events, such as the 2016 Brexit referendum or the 2016 US
presidential elections, only a very small number of bots participated in the Twitter discussion on the 2016
Austrian presidential election.
1 Introduction
Social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter provide public communication channels that
enable every individual, company, political party, or government agency to directly get in touch with each
other via text messages, pictures, or videos. Thereby, social media break the communication patterns of more
traditional media (such as TV channels or newspaper publishers) by democratizing targeted mass communication
to a certain degree. However, aside from sharing messages with friends, family, fans, or customers, social media
are, at an increasing rate, also used in political campaigns [GGR10, GJB16, CKW15] and for the decentralized
coordination of political protests [CHL+12, TPG+14, STMVF15], for example.
Moreover, because rumors are spreading quickly in social networks [DFF12], social media are also a tool
for spreading misinformation such as political propaganda [Cer17]. While it is not exactly a new finding that
information found on the internet is not reliable per se [GM03], the matter becomes more and more important due
to the heavy use of online (mis)information campaigns and phenomena such as social bots (autonomous software
agents for social media platforms) [FVD+16, BF16]. In addition to social bots that might try to influence
human users, one must also take into account how community feedback shapes user behavior [CDNML14] and
consider the significant role that official social media accounts play in an online debate [AFD+16]. Furthermore,
and aside from the properties of a particular message source, a thorough analysis has to take the emotional
dimension of a discussion into account [KSCC17, KCF+17]. For example, a heated debate over a controversial
topic develops more dynamically and unpredictably than an objective discussion and might therefore be more
easily manipulated. In this context, sentiment analysis methods [Liu16] help classify and understand the users’
emotions.
It was already in 2013 that the World Economic Forum called misinformation in social networks "digital
wildfires" which cause a global risk and may lead to serious societal, economic, and political consequences by
endangering democracy or influencing markets [WEF13]. Thus, in a world involving a wide variety of reliable as
well as unreliable message sources, "alternative facts", and fake news [Hig16], scientists of all disciplines have an
obligation to provide the public with the tools and the information to separate fact from fiction [Mak17, Wil16].
However, the sheer complexity of socio-technical systems [MP07, Mit11] and the big data characteristics of
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complex networks [TWX16] make the analysis of social media events a difficult task. Therefore, a number
of research projects, such as the DARPA Twitter bot challenge [SAD+16], aim to improve our capabilities
for the analysis and understanding of social media campaigns [FG14, TZ14]. In this context, case studies
of real-world political campaigns are of particular interest because they help understand human behavior,
detect patterns, and identify generic approaches for analyzing user behavior in online social networks (see, e.g.,
[GJB16, LM11, SKJ14, KK16, AJC16, AAP17]).
In the 2016 Austrian presidential elections, Austria has witnessed two polarizing opinions among its citizens.
A candidate of the Freedom Party of Austria, Norbert Hofer, and his opposing candidate, a former member
of the Green Party, Alexander Van der Bellen were in a tight run for the presidential seat. The first round
of the elections took place on April 24th 2016, when Norbert Hofer received a majority of the votes (36.40%),
followed by Alexander Van der Bellen (20.38%), while four other candidates (Irmgard Griss, Rudolf Hundstorfer,
Andreas Khol, and Richard Lugner) dropped out of the elections. The second round, which took place on May
22nd 2016, was a run-off ballot between Hofer and Van der Bellen. Alexander Van der Bellen won with 50.3% of
the votes [BMI16a]. However, the results of this election have been invalidated by the Austrian constitutional
court in July 2016 due to procedural irregularities in vote counting1. After the re-elections were postponed
due to faulty glue on the envelopes for postal voting [Con16], the repeat of the run-off ballot finally took place
on December 4th 2016, when Van der Bellen was elected president with 53.8% of the votes [BMI16b]. The
inauguration ceremony took place on January 26th 2017.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the Twitter discussion related to the 2016 Austrian
presidential elections. In particular, we extracted and analyzed a data-set consisting of 343645 Twitter messages
The resulting data-set is multi-dimensional, including temporal data, structural data (such as the underlying
communication network or the corresponding topic/hashtag network), as well information on the user’s emotions
that are expressed in the content of the messages. In order to provide an in-depth analysis, we therefore
combined methods from network science [New10, Jac10], sentiment analysis [Liu16], as well as bot detection
[FVD+16, SAD+16].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an approach synopsis and
discuss the guiding research questions for our study. Subsequently, Section 3 presents a systematic analysis of
the Twitter discussion on the 2016 Austrian presidential elections. In Section 4, we further discuss our findings,
the general approach for analyzing social media events, as well as the limitations of our study. Section 5 discusses
related work, before Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Research Questions and Approach Synopsis
2.1 Research questions
We defined the following guiding research questions for our analysis:
RQ1: What is the tweeting behavior of the presidential candidates?
In specific, we examined three aspects: temporal characteristics of each candidate’s tweeting behavior
(RQ1.1), each candidate’s engagement style (RQ1.2), as well as each candidate’s campaigning style (RQ1.3).
RQ1.1: What are the temporal characteristics of each candidate’s tweeting behavior?
Research question RQ1.1 provides a quantitative analysis of the tweeting behavior and examines how many
daily tweets have been posted by a candidate during the presidential elections. For example, we identify
associations between important events (such as a TV discussion) and the corresponding tweet count.
RQ1.2: What is the engagement style of each candidate ?
In research question RQ1.2, we focus on the way each candidate uses Twitter as a tool for communication
with their supporters. In particular, we investigated each candidate’s interaction with their followers, including
the ratio between the candidates’ broadcasting behavior and bilateral (one-to-one) communication. In addition
to the quantitative analysis of the engagement styles, we also examine the content of the candidates’ tweets and
report on the emotions they spread during their presidential campaign – the emotions have been identified by
1Note that on July 1st 2016, Austria’s constitutional court ruled that the presidential election must be repeated due to irregual-
rities and formal errors in the counting procedures for postal votes in 14 voting districts. As a result of those errors, there was an
abstract chance of voter fraud. Evidence of actual voter fraud has not been found though.
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using sentiment analysis techniques (see Section 3.1.3). Furthermore, we examine the reactions of Twitter users
on the candidates’ tweets in terms of re-tweets, responses, and likes.
RQ1.3: Is there evidence of different types of campaigning ?
Political campaigns are generally described as "positive" or "negative", depending on how the candidates
address their opponents. In our study, we follow the definition from [PDJM11], which describes negative cam-
paigning as a type of campaigning which may involve misinformation, “dirty tricks”, attacks on the opponent’s
persona (also called political character assassination), or stress his/her weaknesses or failures from the past.
In contrast, positive campaigning disseminates information about a candidate’s positive future plans or his/her
past success. For example, the use of negative campaigning has been well-documented by reputable media
during the 2016 US presidential elections (see, e.g., [BF16]). Even though this campaigning strategy prospec-
tively contributed to the success of the Republican candidate (Donald Trump), there is evidence that negative
campaigning is risky and might backfire, leading to undesired effects (e.g. by making a candidate less likeable,
see [PDJM11]). As part of our study, we examined cases of negative campaigning found in our data-set (includ-
ing the spread of misinformation and rumors) and the effects on the candidates’ followers. We do this by 1)
searching for known false accusations in our data-set and 2) analyzing the opinion polarities a candidate uses
to address the opposing candidate (i.e. does the candidate mention his rival in a positive or a negative context).
RQ2: What is the tweeting behavior of users tweeting about 2016 Austrian presidential elections ?
RQ2.1: In which context do followers mention the candidates ?
Here we refer to the context in which ("ordinary") Twitter users addressed both candidates. In particular, we
used network analysis techniques (see, e.g., [New10, Jac10, Pit15, VR07]) to derive and analyze ego-networks
of hashtags for each candidate.
RQ2.2: What are the communication patterns among the candidates’ followers ?
Here, we examine whether communities exist among each candidate’s followers. In particular, we derive
a communication network and analyze whether users tend to communicate with the followers of the opposing
candidate or within their group only.
RQ3: Is there evidence of bots participating in the Twitter discussion ?
Here we investigate whether bots are participating in the Twitter discourse, and if so, how they relate to
different aspects of information sharing over Twitter. In particular, this refers to the reactions of human users
on bots, as well as the contents disseminated by bots (see, e.g., [FVD+16, SAD+16, DVF+16]).
2.2 Approach synopsis
In order to get a comprehensive picture of the Twitter discussions during the 2016 Austrian presidential elections,
we examined the tweeting behavior of the two candidates (Alexander Van der Bellen and Norbert Hofer)2 and
analyzed how their tweeting strategy influenced the tweeting behavior of their respective followers as well as
the followers of the opposing candidate. In this context, we define tweeting behavior as sending a new tweet,
replying to a tweet, liking another user’s tweet, and re-tweeting an existing message.
To study the tweeting behavior, we differentiate between the candidates’ tweeting behavior, the tweeting
behavior of their followers, as well as the tweeting behavior of autonomous software programs (bots). Our
analysis follows three main research questions (see Section 2.1) and has been separated in four main phases (see
Figure 1).
Phase 1 - Data extraction: In the data extraction phase, we used Twitter’s API3 to collect tweets about
the 2016 Austrian Presidential Election. In particular, we collected German language and English language
tweets for the run-off election that took place at December 4th 2016. We started the data extraction proce-
dure on November 14th 2016 (three weeks before the election) and continued the extraction procedure until
December 14th 2016 (10 days after the election). Even though the official language in Austria is German, we
were also interested in English language tweets to capture the opinion of foreigners living in Austria as well
as people interested in the elections who were living outside of the country. The data extraction procedure
2In particular, we analyzed messages sent from the @vanderbellen and @norbertghofer Twitter accounts. It is not possible,
however, to determine if a particular message was sent by one of the candidates or by some member of their respective social media
teams.
3https://dev.twitter.com/overview/api
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Figure 1: Approach overview: Analyzing social media events
resulted in a data-set consisting of 343766 tweets, 206372 of which are English language tweets and 136372 are
German language tweets. Moreover, from March 1st 2016 till December 14th 2016 we also extracted the tweets
directly issued by the two presidential candidates, giving us 602 tweets posted by Alexander Van der Bellen
(@vanderbellen) and 420 tweets posted by Norbert Hofer (@norbertghofer). The 343766 tweets included 121
double entries (see below), giving us a total of 343645 unique tweets. In order to extract relevant tweets from
the Twitter message stream, we thoroughly examined the hashtags used by each campaign and then applied
the following list of hashtags for filtering: #vdb, #vdb16, #VanDerBellen, #MehrDennJe, #NorbertHofer,
#NorbertHofer2016, #Hofer, #bpw16, #AustrianElection, as well as combined occurrences of #Austria and
#election. For each of the 343645 tweets, we extracted the following information:
• the text body of the tweet,
• the corresponding Twitter username,
• the time and date when the tweet has been published,
• the corresponding re-tweet count,
• and the corresponding “like” count.
For the tweets of the two presidential candidates, we also extracted the reply count for each of the candidate’s
tweets and a list of their followers (Twitter IDs and usernames).
Phase 2 - Data pre-processing: In the data pre-processing phase, we dealt with aggregating and encoding
the raw data gathered in Phase 1. Thus, we inserted new columns into the data-set – e.g. the "follower" column
includes discrete values from "0" to "3", where 0 meant that the respective Twitter user does not follow any
candidate, 1 encodes followers of Van der Bellen, 2 encodes followers of Norbert Hofer, and 3 encodes followers
of both candidates. Moreover, we added the reply count to the candidates’ data-sets. Since we used the above
list of hashtags to extract our data, tweets that use a combination of those hashtags might have produced double
entries in our data-set. For example, the following three hashtags have been combined particularly often in the
same tweet: #vdb,#bpw16, and #norberthofer. Therefore, we applied a data cleaning procedure to identify and
remove 121 double entries from our data-set. Moreover, since people freely express themselves on Twitter, the
language is not formal and contains spelling errors, abbreviations, alternative spelling, and slang words, which,
if not addressed properly, might cause errors in a subsequent data analysis (see, e.g., [VdBACEH05]). Thus, in
order to normalize the extracted data we manually searched for and adjusted typing errors (e.g. we corrected
“van der Belen” to “Van der Bellen”, “Östereich” to “Österreich”, etc.) or alternative spelling (e.g. we replaced
“Oesterreich” with “Österreich”, “Praesident” with “Präsident”, etc.).
Phase 3 - Data-set preparation: In this phase, we ran the data-set through SentiStrength [TBP+10]
and the BotOrNot Python API [DVF+16] to obtain sentiment scores for each tweet and bot scores for each
username. In addition, we also applied the NRC emotion-word dictionary [MT13] over the tweets and stored
emotions identified in the tweets. These scores were then added to our data-set (see also Section 3).
4
Phase 4 - Data analysis: In the analysis phase, we conducted our data analysis over the final version
of the data-set (see also Figure 1). In particular, we used text mining techniques, sentiment analysis, network
analysis, and quantitative data analysis to find patterns in the user’s tweeting behavior (see Section 3).
Software tools: For data extraction, pre-processing, and data analysis, we used R4, as well as the follwing
R packages: igraph5, stringr6, and tm7. Furthermore, we used the SentiStrength8 tool and the NRC dictionary9
for extracting sentiment polarities and emotion vectors. Finally, we used the BotOrNot Python API10 for bot
detection purposes.
3 Data Analysis
3.1 Tweeting behavior of the presidential candidates (RQ1)
3.1.1 Temporal properties of the candidates’ tweeting behavior
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Figure 2: Van der Bellen’s tweeting timeline.
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Figure 3: Hofer’s tweeting timeline.
Our data-set includes tweets that the presidential candidates posted between March 1st 2016 and December
14th 2016 (see Section 2.2). Figures 2 and 3 show the tweet count per day for each candidate, with dashed lines
indicating important real-world events that happened during the campaign. In particular, the two black dashed
lines mark the election days (May 22nd and December 4th 2016), the orange, magenta, and red lines each
mark the dates of different TV discussions between the candidates respectively11. The plots in Figures 2 and 3
show the tendency of the candidates to increase their tweeting activity shortly before an important event. Such
behavior has also been observed in other elections in Europe (see, e.g., [SKG+15]). In our data-set, this trend
is particularly evident in Van der Bellen’s tweeting timeline. In contrast, Norbert Hofer’s tweeting activity was
comparatively low during the first round of elections but increased considerably since October 2016. Moreover,
Figure 3 shows a peak on September 1st. Since no important political event (such as an election day or a TV
discussion) took place around that date which would explain such an increase in the tweet count, we manually
examined the content of the corresponding tweets. In this particular case, the candidate responded to negative
tweets that were directed at him.
4https://www.r-project.org/
5http://igraph.org/
6https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/stringr/
7https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm/
8http://sentistrength.wlv.ac.uk/
9http://saifmohammad.com/WebPages/NRC-Emotion-Lexicon.htm
10https://github.com/truthy/botornot-python/
11The red line marks the discussion broadcast on PULS4 (November 20th), the magenta line marks the discussion broadcast on
ATV (November 27th), and the orange line marks the date of a TV debate broadcast on ORF2 (December 1st)
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3.1.2 Engagement style of the presidential candidates
In addition to the tweeting frequency, the message contents also showed that the candidates followed different
approaches. Tweets originating from Van der Bellen’s account frequently used the candidate’s first name, the
name of the country (Österreich, German for “Austria”), as well as a range of positive words, such as "together"
(de: gemeinsam), "collaboration" (de: Zusammenarbeit), "support" (de: unterstützen), as well as informative
words about his presence in the media (de: Gast, Interview, Plakatpräsentation). Tweets originating from
Norbert Hofer’s account used a more personal approach to address his supporters. The tweets often started
with the term “dear friends” (de: liebe Freunde) and ended with “yours Norbert ” (de: Euer Norbert).
Sentiment analysis [Liu16] is concerned with studying people’s opinions, attitudes, and emotions by analyzing
written text. For example, the corresponding techniques are used for analyzing public opinion during elections
(see, e.g., [DAORN12]), for identifying potential radicalization suspects ([BCM+09]), or even for predicting
stock market events (see, e.g., [BM11, ZSA14]).
In order to gain more insight into the emotions and sentiment polarities both candidates target in their
followers, we analyzed the sentiment polarities by using the SentiStrength algorithm [TBP+10]. Moreover, we
identified 8 basic emotions according to Plutchik’s wheel of emotions [Plu01] by applying the NRC lexicon
[MT13] over the candidates’ tweets. Our analysis was based on the assumption that a single tweet may contain
positive emotions, negative emotions, or a mixture of both.
Figures 4 and 5 summarize the sentiment polarities we identified in each candidate’s tweets. In particular, we
grouped the tweets into one of four categories respectively: positive, negative, neutral, or overlap between posi-
tive and negative polarity. This classification was done by using the sentiment scores given by the SentiStrength
algorithm.
Figures 4 and 5 show a substantial difference in sentiment polarities as communicated by each candidate. Van
der Bellen mostly posted neutral tweets where he announced TV debates, radio talk shows, and other pre-election
events. In addition, a number of positive tweets originated from Van der Bellen’s account, with their number
increasing on election day when the candidate expressed his gratitude and thanks to his supporters. While the
number is comparatively low, Van der Bellen’s tweets also include some tweets with negative sentiment polarity
scores. Those negative messages mostly refer to negative events that happened worldwide, such as bombings
in Istanbul (Turkey) that took place on December 10th 2016. In comparison, tweets originating from Norbert
Hofer’s account are more emotionally driven. In particular, he shared comparatively more tweets with positive
and negative emotions, such as his love for the country, and gratitude to his supporters (positive), as well as
tweets with a negative content (such as answers to negative tweets about himself and his opinion on terrorist
attacks).
Figure 4: Sentiments in Van der Bellen’s tweets. Figure 5: Sentiments in Norbert Hofer’s tweets.
To further examine which emotions contribute to the positive and negative sentiment scores, we used the
NRC lexicon to identify eight basic emotions according to Plutchik’s wheel of emotions. In particular, we found
anger, disgust, fear, and sadness for negative SentiStrength sentiment scores as well as joy and trust for positive
SentiStrength scores. The results shown in Figure 6 indicate that even though Van der Bellen posted more
tweets in total, his tweets were not as emotionally charged as those posted from Norbert Hofer’s account.
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Figure 6: Emotions communicated by both presidential candidates.
The results further indicate a larger difference in the range of negative emotions (anger, sadness, disgust, and
fear) than in positive emotions (joy and trust). Therefore, after examining the emotions communicated by both
candidates, we can identify a noticeable distinction in the communication strategy between both candidates.
While Van der Bellen posted predominantly messages with a neutral sentiment score (esp. tweets of informative
nature), Norber Hofer addressed his supporters with more emotional and personal tweets.
To promote their campaign over Twitter in terms of hashtags, the two candidates again took different ap-
proaches. Tweets that originated from Van der Bellen’s account used the hashtag #vanderbellen in their tweets,
while tweets originating from Norbert Hofer’s account did not use his own name as a hashtag. Instead, Norbert
Hofer used hashtags to indicate important TV discussions (#dasduell, #orfduell, #puls4, #atv). Furthermore,
both candidates used the official Austrian presidential election hashtag #bpw16 (an acronym for German:
“Bundespräsidentenwahl 2016”).
Next, we analyze the reactions of other ("ordinary") Twitter users to the tweets posted by both candidates.
In particular, we examined the number of replies, re-tweets, and likes averaged over the total number of tweets
posted by each candidate (see Figure 7). The results indicate that, in general, Norbert Hofer inspired more
replies to his tweets, while Van der Bellen’s tweets received more likes and re-tweets.
Because two Twitter users can directly communicate with each other by using the @ character followed by
the other user’s username, we were able to trace such direct communication. In total, 35.05% of the tweets
posted by Van der Bellen are messages directed to another user. These tweets predominantly occurred towards
the end of the data extraction period when the candidate thanked users for their congratulation messages after
winning the presidential elections. In contrast, only 15% of the tweets originating from Norbert Hofer’s account
are direct responses to another user’s tweets.
7
4.39
5.74
27.71
13.43
79.35
44.04
0
20
40
60
80
Tweeting behavior by candidates’ supporters
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 v
a
lu
e
s
Candidate
NH
VDB
Replies                           Retweets                           Likes
Figure 7: Summary of the tweeting behavior separated by followers of each candidate.
In our analysis, we also observed a strong positive correlation between the re-tweet-count and the like-
count for both presidential candidates. Pearson’s coefficient for re-tweets of Norbert Hofer’s messages and
corresponding likes is a strong positive 0.94, while Van der Bellen’s messages show a correlation coefficient of
0.95 between re-tweets and likes. Figure 8 shows that, compared to tweets from Van der Bellen’s account, tweets
originating from Norbert Hofer’s account generally received considerably more re-tweets, replies, and likes if the
respective message expressed positive or negative emotions.
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Figure 8: Tweeting behavior for positive and negative sentiment scores (Hofer: blue, Van der Bellen: green)
Since the three most replied tweets from both candidates expressed emotions, we also examined if the reply
count correlates with emotionally charged tweets. We found that for messages originating from Van der Bellen’s
account, the association between positive emotions and the reply count is weak and negative (Pearson coefficient
equals -0.0012), while tweets with negative emotions exhibit a positive, but weak correlation with the reply count
(Pearson’s coefficient is 0.023). With respect to messages originating from Norbert Hofer’s account, positive
emotions and negative emotions both positively correlate with the reply-count (Pearson’s coefficient for positive
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emotions and reply-count is 0.14, while for negative emotions and reply-count Pearson’s coefficient is 0.12).
3.1.3 Analysis of campaign styles with respect sentiment polarities
During the 2016 Austrian presidential election, there was some evidence of negative campaigning in the Austrian
media (e.g. TV discussions where Van der Bellen was accused of being a spy [Pre16b, ORF16]). In our dataset,
we found a subset of tweets posted by each candidate that mention the opposing candidate or his (former) party
(FPÖ for Norbet Hofer and Green party for Van der Bellen). In total, 1.82% (11) of the tweets originating from
Van der Bellen’s account mention Norbert Hofer, seven of which are neutral (esp. announcements for TV or
radio discussions with Norbert Hofer), while the rest share a negative sentiment about the opposing candidate.
In comparison, tweets originating from Norbert Hofer’s account mentioned his opponent slightly more often. In
particular, 3.57% (15) of the tweets mention Van der Bellen, five of which are neutral, while the rest directly
express some opinion that results in a negative SentiStrength sentiment score about the Green party or one of
Van der Bellen’s messages. Figures 9 and 10 show the emotions found in tweets that each candidate used to
address his opponent.
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For each candidate, Figures 11 and 12 show the impact of tweets about the opposing candidate in comparison
to tweets on other topics. In particular, the plots show the arithmetic mean of the re-tweet count, reply-count,
and like-count for messages mentioning the opposing candidate in contrast to the respective numbers for tweets
on other topics. In general, tweets in which Van der Bellen mentioned Hofer received slightly more re-tweets and
replies than his tweets on other topics. In the same way, Norbert Hofer’s tweets that mention Van der Bellen
received more replies and re-tweets than his tweets on other topics, however, considerably less likes, compared
to other tweets.
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Figure 11: Comparison of the tweets in which Nor-
bert Hofer was mentioned and other tweets posted by
Van der Bellen.
Like
Figure 12: Comparison of the tweets in which Van
der Bellen was mentioned and other tweets posted by
Norbert Hofer.
Spread of negative information: Figures 13, 14, and 15 show three examples of negative campaigning
that referred to video statements and got the most re-tweets. In particular, Figure 13 shows the re-tweet count
for the video statement “Up to now, I always voted for the FPÖ. Why I vote now for #VanderBellen.”. The
tweet was published by Van der Bellen’s official Twitter account on December 1st 2016 at 7:37 AM. Subsequently,
it has been re-tweeted and copied over Twitter by 167 distinct followers of Van der Bellen and 2 followers of
Norbert Hofer.
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Figure 13: re-tweet count for the video statement
“Up to now, I always voted for the FPÖ. Why I vote
now for #VanderBellen.”.
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Figure 14: re-tweet count for the video statement
“Gertrude, an 89 year old holocaust survivor warns
against FPÖ.”
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Figure 15: Re-tweet count for the video statement “Hate in the network and why I am against Van der Bellen.”
A second example is shown in Figure 14, which is another video statement referred to in a tweet that
originated from Van der Bellen’s account. This video shows an 89-year old holocaust survivor who warns
against voting for FPÖ (respectively Norbert Hofer). The tweet was published by the official Twitter account
of Van der Bellen on November 24th 2016 at 10:33 AM. Subsequently, it was also disseminated into the English
language Twitter-sphere and was re-tweeted and copied 864 times by 135 distinct followers of Van der Bellen
and 2 followers of Norbert Hofer. This particular tweet is also the one that continued to spread for the longest
time of all tweets that carried negative information about the opposing candidate. Moreover, it is the third most
re-tweeted message in our data-set, only preceded by two tweets in which Van der Bellen thanks his supporters
for their votes and a tweet which invites people to vote.
Figure 15 shows the re-tweet count for the video statement “Hate in the network and why I am against
Van der Bellen.” which was published by one of Norbert Hofer’s followers on August 7th 2016 on YouTube.
Subsequently, it reached Twitter and was re-tweeted 68 times by 2 followers of Norbert Hofer, and 16 users that
do not follow either of the candidates on Twitter. In this example, we witness a higher average re-tweet count
(3.78) by each user, whereby one of Norbert Hofer’s followers alone was responsible for 12 out of 68 (17.65%)
re-tweets.
Spread of misinformation: In addition to the spread of negative information, the 2016 Austrian presiden-
tial elections also witnessed a number of messages including misinformation that spread over Twitter, most of
which targeted at Van der Bellen. In particular, the tweets that carry misinformation refer to false accusations
of Van der Bellen being a communist spy, and that he suffers from cancer and dementia. We classified this
information as misinformation because it has been rebuked by reputable and credible sources, such as quality
newspapers including “Der Standard” and “Die Presse” (see, e.g., [Sta16, Pre16a, EM16]). Note, however, that
neither of the aforementioned examples was posted from Norbert Hofer’s Twitter account. Nevertheless, it was
mentioned during the candidates’ TV discussions and later on discussed and spread over Twitter by (predomi-
nantly and surprisingly) Van der Bellen’s followers. Thus, Van der Bellen’s followers substantially participated
in the dissemination of misinformation concerning Van der Bellen.
In particular, we identified four cases of misinformation in our data-set. In Figure 16, the red line represents
the misinformation about Van der Bellen being a spy. In the plot we can observe that the highest peak of
this information stream was reached on December 1st 2016, the date of the ORF2 TV-discussion, when Hofer
suggested on TV that Van der Bellen is a spy (see [Pre16b]). In order to gain further insight into people’s
reactions and behavior over Twitter once they have been exposed to the misinformation, we manually examined
the tweets referring to this false “Spy” accusation12.
12Note that in this paper we provide a detailed discussion of one particular misinformation stream - which is the one related
to the spy accusations. We chose to present this case in detail because it was the most abundant stream regarding its scope (i.e.
highest number of reactions and the longest time period).
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On the one hand, the corresponding tweets exhibited signs of information seeking (e.g. “Was Alexander
#VanderBellen a spy? ” followed by a link to an information source). We found 53 such tweets (including
corresponding re-tweets) that were posted a day after the TV discussion and continued spreading for three
days after the discussion. Thus, the misinformation was at first regarded a rumor by some Twitter users
that was yet to be confirmed or rebuked. Other users showed signs of annoyance (e.g. “What next is #VdB
going to be?”) (13 tweets), assumed a threat to Van der Bellen’s election success (e.g. “Spy accusations might
cost #VanDerBellen the elections”) (23 tweets), sarcasm (see, e.g., Figure 17 and “#VanDerBond: A spy
who loved me.” or “#VanDerBellen aka spy agent, I always wanted to have James Bond as a president!”) (36
tweets), and tweets that found the accusation amusing (e.g. “Get your popcorn and turn on @ORF”) (10 tweets).
Although the defending tweets and information seeking tweets were predominant in our data-set, there was also
a comparatively smaller number of tweets that confirmed the accusation by providing alleged evidence (e.g. “A
book of an ex-security manager is a surprisingly good source: VdB actually was a communist spy.”), calling the
candidate “ineligible” (German: unwählbar), or criticized Hofer for bringing up the false accusation in the first
place (e.g. “Mr. #Hofer as a president should speak the truth.”, or via a hashtag #liar next to #hofer). Thus,
spreading misinformation as a campaigning strategy has also shown its risks as it partially backfired against the
spreader (Hofer).
0
50
100
150
Date
T
w
e
e
t 
c
o
u
n
t
Misinformation
Spy
Cancer
Nazi father
Dementia
Nov 21 Nov 28 Dec 05ORF2-TV Duel
Figure 16: The time-series plot of 4 instances of mis-
information spread over Twitter during the presiden-
tial elections.
Figure 17: A sarcastic reaction to the tweet suggest-
ing that Van der Bellen is a spy that writes: “I just
found a top secret photo of Van der Bellen’s spying
activities”. This tweet was posted by one of Van der
Bellen’s followers. It was re-tweeted by two other of
his followers as well as two Twitter users that did not
follow either candidate on Twitter.
3.2 Tweeting behavior of other Twitter users (RQ2)
In this section, we examine communication patterns and the connectivity among the followers of both presidential
candidates. Thus, the subsequent discussion refers to tweets posted by Twitter users other than Van der
Bellen and Hofer. We also compare the results that can be obtained from the 136372 German language tweets
(subsequently referred to as the "German language data-set") to the corresponding results of the 206372 English
language tweets (subsequently referred to as the "English language data-set").
3.2.1 Context of the tweets mentioning each candidate
First, we were able to confirm that a considerable amount of Twitter content consists of re-tweets. In particular,
only 43.1% of the 136372 tweets in the German language data-set are original tweets, while the remaining
56.9% are re-tweets. This is even more obvious in the English language data-set, where only 29.89% of the
206372 tweets are original tweets while 70.11% are re-tweets. However, this result was expected to a certain
degree, since the English Twitter-sphere was predominantly used to disseminate important facts about the
Austrian elections, with little to no one-to-one discussion (see also the corresponding network analysis below).
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In comparison, the German Twitter-sphere witnessed a more extensive discussion about the candidates and the
events that happened during the election period.
In order to identify relations between Twitter topics, we derived the corresponding hashtag network. The
hashtag network derived from the German language data-set is an undirected network and consists of 5233
distinct vertices and 23535 edges, with an average vertex degree of 9.01. In total, the network includes nine
connected components. In particular, some hashtags are isolated and not used in a combination with the
hashtags in the giant component of the network.
The vertices (hashtags) with the largest degree (δ) are #bpw16 (δ=3872), #Hofer (δ=1597), #vdb (δ=1464),
#vanderbellen (δ=1054), and #Österreich (δ=708). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that in the German
language hashtag network, the hashtags #MarineLePen (δ=325), #ViktorOrban (δ=293), and #Trump (δ=233)
are among the top fifteen vertices with respect to the vertex degree. The German language hashtag network
also shows that both candidates were addressed in a positive and a negative context respectively.
To examine the context of the discussion related to different hashtags, we also derived two ego-networks, one
for each candidate. Figure 19 shows Norbert Hofer’s (#hofer) German language ego-network which consists of
1596 vertices and 10846 edges (network density ≈ 0.01). The German language ego-network of Van der Bellen
consists of 1463 vertices and 9878 edges (network density ≈ 0.01). In particular, an ego-network consisting of
hashtags may reveal valuable insights about the topics people associate with each candidate. After a thorough
examination of the hashtags directly connected to each candidate, we identified five categories of hashtags in
both ego-networks. Those categories are:
• hashtags that directly support a candidate (here we excluded the general hashtag which carries the candi-
date’s name only, because it can either appear in a tweet with negative or positive sentiment polarities),
• hashtags that carry general information about the 2016 Austrian presidential elections (e.g. newspaper
titles, TV station names, party names, important dates),
• hashtags that directly oppose (speak against) a candidate,
• hashtags that refer to important topics discussed during the presidential election,
• as well as other (hashtags that neither support, go against, carry general information about the elections,
or refer to important topics).
Below, we list examples from each category:
1. Supporting: e.g. #vote4vdb, #teamvanderbellen, etc., and #Hofer4President, #hofer2016, etc.
2. General: e.g. #bpw16, #presidentialElection, #norberthofer, #VanDerBellen, etc.
3. Against: e.g. #notoVDB, #VollDerBluff, and #womenAgainsthofer, #nohofer, etc.
4. Important topics: e.g. #Islam, #HillaryClinton, #Trump, #terror, #Brexit, #Burka, etc.
5. Other: e.g. #Styria, #Monday, #Christmas, etc.
Figures 18 and 19 show an extract of the German language ego-networks including the vertices which belong
to the categories supporting, general, against, and important topics (i.e. vertices belonging to the "other"
category have been excluded from these plots). The corresponding ego-network for Hofer includes 622 vertices
and 4826 edges (network density ≈ 0.025). The respective ego-network of Van der Bellen includes 482 vertices
and 3938 edges (network density ≈ 0.034)13. Vertices in the Supporting category are plotted in green color,
vertices from the Against category are plotted in red, vertices on Important topics in yellow, and General
information in gray.
Compared to the German hashtag ego-network, the English language ego-network includes a smaller number
of vertices, indicating a lower variety of hashtags. In particular, the corresponding ego-network of Van der
Bellen (see Figure 20) includes 131 vertices and 1057 edges (network density ≈ 0.124). The English language
ego-network of Hofer (Figure 21) includes 293 vertices and 1927 edges (network density ≈ 0.045). The low
number of unique hashtags (vertices) results from the fact that the English data-set predominantly consists of
re-tweets (see also Section 3.2).
13Note that in the plots the size of a vertex is based on its degree, and the network topology was visualized based on each vertex’s
community membership. For visualization purposes, we applied the community detection algorithm available in Gephi, as described
in [BGLL08].
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Figure 18: German ego network of Van der Bellen
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Figure 21: English ego network of Hofer.
Figures 18, 19, 20, and 21, show that there is a considerable difference in the way Twitter users refer to each
candidate in their tweets. Both, the German and English hashtag ego-networks of Norbert Hofer exhibit more
vertices (hashtags) that directly refer to the candidate in a negative context (e.g. #NoToHofer) as compared
to the ego-networks of Alexander Van der Bellen (see also Table 1). On the other hand, hashtags that put a
candidate in a positive light are used more often in Van der Bellen’s ego-networks, as compared to the ones
of Norbert Hofer. In Table 1, we provide a summary of the relative sizes of the hashtag categories, with the
maximum value highlighted in bold respectively.
Supporting (%) Against (%) General (%) Important topics (%)
VDB (de) 7.68 3.73 43.15 45.44
VDB (en) 3.06 0 50.38 46.56
NH (de) 1.93 18.49 41.64 37.94
NH (en) 2.39 4.44 32.42 60.75
Table 1: Summary of the hashtag categories.
Although the hashtag ego-networks provide insights into the topics people associate with the candidates,
this information alone is not sufficient for deducing the users’ general opinion towards each candidate. Thus,
in order to get more fine-grained evidence of whether a candidate has been supported by the Twitter users, we
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also performed an in-depth analysis of the degree-distributions as well as the textual cues and emoticons in the
corresponding tweets (see Section 3.2.2).
3.2.2 Communication among the candidates’ followers
In addition to the ego-networks, we derived the communication network of the candidates’ followers14. The
communication network is a directed network between pairs of usernames that exchanged messages by using
the @ symbol. In particular, a directed edge between two vertices means that the start-vertex of the respective
edge sent a Twitter message to the end-vertex of the edge.
Overall German language communication network
The overall German language communication network (including non-followers, i.e. Twitter users who partici-
pated in the corresponding Twitter discussion but do not follow either candidate) includes 19669 vertices and
58883 edges distributed over 596 connected components. To examine the degree-distribution for the German
language communication network, we first derived separate data-sets for the in-degree and the out-degree distri-
bution respectively. Next, we removed the vertices having an in-degree or an out-degree of zero15. Such vertices
represent users who either did not directly communicate with another Twitter user but just posted tweets that
didn’t include the @ symbol (out-degree=0), or users with whom no other Twitter user in our data-set com-
municated (in-degree=0). In this context, it is worth mentioning that we found a comparatively high number
of users that had an in-degree of zero (14272, which corresponds to 72.56% of all users in our data-set), while
a much smaller number of users had an out-degree of zero (2655).
We then applied a model fitting procedure to the in-degree and out-degree data-sets in order to determine
the "best" fit for each of them. In particular, we applied the statistical framework presented by Clauset et al.
[CSN09] and all computations have been performed with the poweRlaw package [Gil15]. Thus, following Clauset
et al., we first derived parameter estimates that fit our data to a discrete power-law, lognormal, exponential, as
well as a Poisson distribution. For example, for the power-law distribution we had to estimate the lower-bound
xmin as well as the scaling parameter α. The parameter estimation followed the procedure described in [CSN09].
Figure 22: Best fits for the in-degree distribution.
14Note that to preserve the anonymity of Twitter users, we plot the vertices unlabeled in all figures.
15Remember that the PDF and PMF of the continuous and discrete power-law distributions are defined for xmin > 0 only. The
same goes for the PDFs of the lognormal and exponential distributions (see also the discussion of the model-fitting procedure in
this section).
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Figures 22 and 23 show the in-degree and out-degree distributions respectively, together with the four model
estimates16. Figure 22 also shows a number of outliers which have a significantly higher in-degree than other
vertices (users). In particular, the outlier to the far right is the user @vanderbellen, who has been talked to
much more frequently than all the other users in the data-set (with an in-degree of 3665). Although Norbert
Hofer (@norbertghofer) was talked to less frequently (in-degree of 1088), he is still the Twitter user with the
second highest in-degree in this communication network.
Figure 23: Best fits for the out-degree distribution.
A visual fitting of statistical models to the true distribution of a data-set is error-prone, though. Moreover,
while we can always find some parameter estimates that provide a fit for each of the four models (power-law,
lognormal, exponential, Poisson) to a particular data-set, these parameter estimates neither tell us whether a
particular fit is good, nor which of the models provides a better fit to the true distribution from which our data
was drawn.
After deriving the parameter estimates, we therefore performed goodness-of-fit tests for the models. In
particular, we performed 5000 simulations (i.e. generated 5000 synthetic data-sets) to compute a goodness-of-fit
p-value for each of the four models. In addition to the goodness-of-fit tests, we directly compared the four models
via a likelihood ratio test. For the direct comparisons, we used Vuong’s test [Vuo89] in order to determine if
the sign of the respective log-likelihood ratio (LR) is statistically significant (for details of the procedures see
[CSN09]).
The goodness-of-fit tests for the in-degree distribution resulted in a p-value of 0.1362 for the lognormal and p-
values of zero (or approx. zero) for all other models, meaning that the lognormal is a plausible hypothesis for the
data, while the other hypotheses (power-law, exponential, Poisson) can be rejected. This result was confirmed
by the direct model comparisons via the likelihood ratio tests. In particular, for all direct comparisons the log-
likelihood ratios indicated that the estimated lognormal model is favored over each of the respective alternatives
(power-law, exponential, Poisson)17 Thus, according to our model fitting procedure, the lognormal distribution
clearly provides the best fit to our data18.
For the out-degree distribution, the situation is not as unambiguous, unfortunately. The goodness-of-fit tests
for the out-degree distribution resulted in a p-value of 0.116 for the exponential, a p-value of 0.0142 for the
lognormal, and p-values of zero for the power-law and Poisson models. However, the fit for the exponential model
has an xmin value of 56, meaning that it only fits to the far right tail of the data-set. Moreover, the exponential
16In particular, the figures show the complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDF) of the estimated models (power-
law, lognormal, exponential, Poisson) on a log-log plot.
17Vuong’s test resulted in statistically significant p-values with p ≤ 0.031 for each of the direct comparisons.
18The tests we performed cannot tell us if another (heavy-tailed) distribution would provide an even better fit, though.
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fit does not explain extreme outliers in the data, such as the vertex with out-degree 490 (see also Figure 23).
Thus, we again performed direct model comparisons via likelihood ratio tests. Here, the results have been
similar to the ones we got for the in-degree distribution. For the out-degree distribution, all log-likelihood ratios
again indicated that the lognormal is favored over each of the respective alternatives (power-law, exponential,
Poisson)19. Moreover, the direct comparisons also indicated that the power-law model is a better fit than the
exponential or the Poisson models. Thus, based on the discussion above, none of the models we tested clearly
provides the best fit. However, the results of the direct comparisons (likelihood ratio tests) at least indicate
that there is a good chance the true distribution of the out-degrees has a heavy-tail.
German language communication network of followers
In order to gain more insight into the communication patterns among the candidates’ followers, we also analyzed
the “follows” relation between Twitter users and each presidential candidate. For this part of the analysis, we
therefore excluded the remaining vertices (non-followers) from the network (see Figure 27). In particular, each
vertex was assigned to one of three categories: followers of Van der Bellen (green), followers of Norbert Hofer
(blue), and followers of both candidates (yellow). In this context, it is important to mention that the “follows”
relation is established between a pair of vertices if a user follows another user (in our data-set one of the
presidential candidates) on Twitter. However, the “follows” relation does not necessarily imply that a user
agrees with the candidate’s values and ideology. In particular, Twitter users may follow an opposing candidate
in order to get more insight into their campaign.
@vanderbellen
@norbertghofer
Figure 24: German language communication network of followers. Green vertices are followers of Van der Bellen, blue
vertices are followers of Norbert Hofer, and yellow vertices follow both presidential candidates.
The German language communication network of followers consists of 2973 vertices and 12278 edges (see
Figure 24). The average vertex degree is 4.13 and the number of connected components is 6. In particular, the
network contains a giant component including the majority of the vertices as well as five smaller components.
To measure the influence of the presidential candidates beyond their vertex degree, we applied the betweenness
centrality measure20. The betweeness centrality of Van der Bellen is 634836.01, while Hofer’s betweenness
19Vuong’s test resulted in statistically significant p-values equal to zero or approx. zero for each of the direct comparisons.
20Note that, because of the nature of the communication network we derived, other centrality measures, such as Eigenvector or
PageRank centrality, would not contribute to a significantly improved understanding of the real-world relations between the vertices
in this network (for a detailed discussion of different centrality measures see, e.g., [New10, Jac10, Pit15, VR07]). In particular, for
this network Eigenvector or PageRank centrality would not contribute much beyond degree centrality. Thus, we chose to include a
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centrality is 144046.31, indicating a considerably larger popularity and influence of Van der Bellen’s Twitter
account with respect to it’s degree (see discussion above and below) and betweeness centrality.
Moreover, the communication network shows a clear distinction of the communication patterns between the
followers of Norbert Hofer (blue) and Van der Bellen (green). In particular, the followers of the two opposing
candidates tend to form clusters and talk within their group. However, the German communication network
also includes a number of individual blue vertices (followers of Norbert Hofer) who engage in a communication
with the followers of Van der Bellen.
Since the network of followers is a digraph, we again distinguish the in-degree and the out-degree distribution
(see Figures 25 and 26). In this network, @vanderbellen is the vertex with the highest in-degree (1290) (i.e.
compared to all other vertices in the network, Van der Bellen was the one who has been directly addressed most
often). Norbert Hofer also belongs to the vertices with a high in-degree (496), however, significantly lower than
Van der Bellen. Thus, our data-set shows signs of a so-called broadcast in-hub network [SRSH14], which is a
network with a vertex (in our case @vanderbellen) with many incoming edges, while the vertices pointing to the
hub are themselves not tightly connected and may form only smaller subgroups21.
Figure 26 shows the out-degree distribution of the German language communication network of followers.
The plot shows that both presidential candidates communicated comparatively less often than some other users
participating in the Twitter discussion. The most active user (in terms of communication with other users)
in the network sent more than 500 tweets, while @vanderbellen and @norbertghofer sent less than 40 tweets
directly to one of the users that officially follow the candidates22. In Section 3.3, we provide an additional
analysis on the meaning of high numbers of outgoing messages from particular users and contrast them to the
behavior of bots that we identified in our data-set.
Hofer
@norbertghofer
Van der Bellen
@vanderbellen
Figure 25: In-degree distribution of the German com-
munication network.
Hofer
@norbertghofer
Van der Bellen
@vanderbellen
Figure 26: Out-degree distribution of the German
communication network.
English language communication network
The communication network resulting from the English language data-set is a directed network with 69588
vertices, 89862 edges, and 2072 connected components. Figure 27 shows a subgraph including 733 vertices, 859
edges, 54 connected components, and an average vertex degree of 1.17. Thus, this particular subgraph includes
1.05% of all vertices. We visualized this subgraph, because it exemplifies the user polarization and a tendency
of the candidates’ followers to communicate within the group they belong to.
path-based centrality measure (here: betweenness centrality) in addition to degree centrality.
21After extracting the ego-network of the @vanderbellen vertex, the resulting network density was ≈ 0.2%, which indicates that
users talking to @vanderbellen tend not to communicate amongst each other. The ego-network of Hofer also exhibits a broadcast
in-hub network (@norbertghofer) and a network density of ≈ 0.8%.
22A word of caution is in order here: While the candidates appear to be engaging rarely in a one-to-one communication, it is
important to note that the actual one-to-one count exceeds the ones presented in Figure 26. This is due to the fact that we only
show an extract of the network in which we filtered out the vertices that do not follow the candidates on Twitter. For example, many
European politicians congratulated Van der Bellen on his victory and Van der Bellen responded to those tweets. However, such
one-to-one messages are not included in Figure 24 because there is no follower-relationship between the respective user accounts.
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Figure 27: Excerpt of the English language communication network.
In addition to the German and English language communication networks, we also analyzed the opinion of
the followers in both communication networks regarding their candidate and his respective opponent. We do
this by first separating the data-set into two groups of followers, one for each candidate. For each group we
used regular expressions to obtain tweets that mention each candidate individually and extract the sentiment
scores as assigned by SentiStrength [TBP+10]. If both candidates were mentioned in a tweet, we extracted the
corresponding tweets and manually classified them as positive or negative for each candidate. For example, a
tweet from our data-set “God knows Norbert Hofer is a Christian and Van der Bellen is Godless” is classified
under positive for Norbert Hofer and negative for Van der Bellen. We stored this information and extracted
the sentiment scores assigned by SentiStrength accordingly. As illustrated in Figure 28, there is a noticeable
difference in the way the followers address the candidates. While Van der Bellen’s followers predominantly
disseminate positive sentiments regarding Van der Bellen, with a comparatively small number of negative
sentiments about Norbert Hofer, the followers of Norbert Hofer tweet mostly negatively about Van der Bellen.
Such tweets even substantially exceed the positive tweets about Norbert Hofer.
3.3 Analysis of potential bot activities (RQ3)
A social bot is an autonomous piece of software with the goal to either increase a user’s popularity [RCM+11],
to influence users [BMBR11], or intentionally harm users by misleading, destroying reputation, manipulating
public opinion [SAD+16], and jeopardizing democracy [FVD+16]. In the past, bots mainly re-created content
(e.g. by re-tweeting messages). Thus, the first bot detection techniques primarily dealt with identifying social
media accounts that do not follow human-like behavioral patterns. However, recently bots have become more
refined and are able to mimic people. For example by actively participating in conversations, following trendy
topics, or following users, which again poses significant challenges in detecting them [SAD+16].
It has been estimated that in 2009 bots generated about 24% of the content on Twitter [TGFY16], and
different analyses reported that the social media discussions on both, the 2016 Brexit referendum as well as the
2016 US presidential elections have been strongly influenced by bots (see, e.g., [BF16, HK16, KHC16]). Thus,
we applied two bot detection techniques to analyze whether bots have been involved in the discussion about
2016 Austrian presidential elections. Because the official language in Austria is German, we focused our analysis
on the German language data-set. In our analysis, we extracted and examined 22450 unique user accounts for
signs of bot behavior23. Our bot analysis combined two approaches. In particular, we used the BotOrNot
23Since users may delete their accounts (i.e. Twitter accounts may not exist anymore at the time of the analysis) or the information
19
V
a
lu
e
 (
%
)
19.38
-1.04
Van der Bellen Hofer Van der Bellen Hofer
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
Van der Bellen's followers Hofer's followers
Figure 28: Supporters’ opinions about their candidate and his respective rival.
Python API [DVF+16] and applied a content generation count. Moreover, we explicitly searched for the word
bot in Twitter user-names to identify self-disclosed bots (as suggested in [HK16, KHC16]).
The BotOrNot API provided us with scores in the closed interval [0-1], where 0 indicates that the account
is not a bot and 1 that it is a bot with a 100% probability. Since BotOrNot scores range from 0 to 1, we split
the scores into three categories:
• accounts with scores between 0 and 0.5 were marked as human accounts,
• accounts with scores between 0.51 and 0.90 were marked potential bots,
• accounts with scores between 0.91 and 1 were marked as bots.
Out of 22450 accounts, BotOrNot identified the majority (20645, 91.96%) as human accounts, while 1117
(4.98%) accounts were marked as potential bots, and 148 (0.66%) accounts were identified as bots with a
probability between 91.00-100%.
Furthermore, by applying the content generation count approach, we marked an account as a bot if it had
a tweet count of 50 tweets/day or more for at least three days during the extraction period, or if the username
contained the word bot [HK16, KHC16]. This procedure resulted in the identification of 20 (potential) bot
accounts (0.09% of the users). A comparison with the respective BotOrNot results shows that BotOrNot
assigned 16 of those 20 to the human account category and 4 to the potential bot category.
While other studies found evidence of significant Twitter bot activity in recent events such as the 2016 US
presidential elections or the 2016 Brexit referendum [BF16, HK16, KHC16], our results indicate that this was
not the case during the 2016 Austrian presidential elections 2016 (see Table 2).
Figure 29 shows daily tweeting activities of the four accounts marked as bots by both bot detection ap-
proaches. Figure 29a) shows the tweeting behavior of two self-disclosed bots, where bot_1 sent one tweet and
bot_2 sent two tweets on election day. Figure 29b) shows the more human-like behavior of another self-disclosed
bot with a smaller number of daily tweets prior the election day, an increase shortly before and during the elec-
tion day, with one day of extreme tweeting activity (an outlier). Finally, Figure 29c) shows the tweeting activity
of a highly active bot account. It is important to note that while observing the tweeting activity of the four
prospective bots, one can observe three distinctive types of tweeting, i.e. in contrast to our expectations, the
four prospective bots did not exhibit a similar (or even uniform) tweeting pattern.
4 Discussion
Over the past decade, social media platforms have become an important channel for people to search infor-
mation, participate in discussions, and share their opinion. As a consequence, the scientific community came
about a Twitter user might be insufficient for the analysis, we were not able to generate bot scores for 2.4% of the user accounts in
our analysis.
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US elections Brexit AT elections (BD1) AT elections (BD2)
Generated content 27.2% ≈ 30% 1.02% 5.29%
RT received - - 0.99% 0.96%
Like count - - 0.57% 2.34%
RT generated - - 1.07% 5.36%
VDB follower - - 0.91% 0.22%
NH follower - - 0.94% 0.11%
Table 2: Comparison of the Twitter bot activity during important political events in 2016a.
aIn the table, BD1 refers to bot detection via BotOrNot, and BD2 refers to the technique that relies on the content generation
count and self-disclosed bots.
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Figure 29: Tweeting behavior of prospective bot accounts.
up with an increasing number of studies that report on different aspects of social media user behavior. These
aspects generally cover the quantitative analysis of information sharing (e.g. tweet and re-tweet count, see, e.g.,
[GGR10, BS13]), sentiment analysis of the messages being spread (see, e.g., [KSCC17, KCF+17, DAORN12]),
as well as network analysis of communication relations (via @username) or hashtag networks (see, e.g., [FG14,
FMT15]). Even though studying each of these aspects of user behavior in isolation may already provide inter-
esting insights, a more comprehensive portrayal of user behavior can only be obtained if the aforementioned
aspects are combined.
The analysis performed for this paper combines methods from sentiment analysis, network analysis, and bot
detection. It thereby complements existing studies on other elections and provides a generic approach that can
be used for analyzing future social media events (see also Sections 2.2 and 4.1).
In our analysis of the 2016 Austrian presidential elections, we found a clear pattern which shows that
emotional tweets (negative as well as positive) are re-tweeted, replied to, and liked more often than the neutral
ones. We can thereby confirm the findings from [SDX13] which reported on similar findings for microblogs. An
explanation for such a user behavior is that emotionally charged tweets also trigger emotions in other users.
For example, an expression of gratitude (identified in both candidates’ data-sets), a message of warning against
the FPÖ candidate sent by a Holocaust survivor, and a message of sadness after loosing the elections generally
received a high number of reactions (likes, replies, and re-tweets).
In addition, we found that occasionally tweets with a neutral sentiment score may also be quite influential
in terms of the reactions caused in other users. For example, Twitter users highly liked, re-tweeted, and replied
to tweets that carried an invitation for the people to vote. A possible explanation is that such tweets convey an
implicit emotion (here: anticipation) which causes a feeling of urgency and importance (e.g. one the respective
tweets said “today every single vote counts”).
In order to analyze the structural properties of the communication network, we derived hashtag ego-networks
which helped significantly to gain further insight into which topics users associate with the candidates. In
particular, we found that hashtags related to important topics are predominant in Norbert Hofer’s English
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language ego-network (60.75%). Such hashtags often carry a controversial note – e.g. “make Austria great
again”, “Trump”, “Öxit”, “Brexit”, etc. In part, such an ego-network might be attributed to the influence of other
media sources (radio shows, online news, etc.), which put Hofer in correlation with the controversial topics (see,
e.g., [Pre16c]). Here it is important to note that one might also approach the task of studying associated topics
by constructing a network of terms used in the tweets. For example, [SKJ14] studied the topics associated
with each presidential candidate during the 2012 Korean presidential elections and re-constructed a network of
terms that appeared in the same tweet. In our case, we found that Van der Bellen was associated with the
topics of respecting human rights and welcoming refugees, to name a few, while his opponent was associated
with loving the homeland and protecting the borders. This confirms that the candidates’ statements from the
TV discussions directly found their way into the social media discussion on Twitter, even though neither of the
candidates directly posted a tweet with a corresponding message.
With respect to the influence of more traditional media (i.e. non-social-media channels such as newspapers
or TV channels), we also examined cases of negative campaigning. In our analysis of negative campaigning,
we made use of reputable Austrian media (newspapers and TV channels) who published evidence that either
confirmed or rejected negative rumors. We used these sources to obtain a list of keywords to find occurrences
of misinformation and negative campaigning in our English and German language data-sets. In particular, we
performed a time-series analysis, follower analysis, and content analysis, and were able to determine the impact
of such tweets on the Twitter discourse.
While aligning our findings with existing rumor theories, we found evidence that complies with Rosnow’s
theory that rumors propagate because of the people’s tendency to clarify uncertain events [Ros91]. Another
study which complements our findings [PDJM11] discussed potential risks to a person spreading misinformation.
Our findings confirm that misinformation may lead to negative consequences for the spreader and backfire against
him/her. In particular, the accusation of Van der Bellen being a spy is a good example where Van der Bellen’s
followers participated in spreading the misinformation over Twitter. In this particular part of our analysis, the
importance of using an integrated data analysis approach is evident. As an example of how a combination of
analysis methods help to correctly classify user behavior, we refer the reader to the ironic reaction by one of
Van der Bellen’s followers (cf. Section 3.1). Without the combined analysis approach that we applied to the
343645 unique tweets in our data-set, such a message would have been falsely classified as misinformation or a
tweet that goes in disfavor of Van der Bellen. It is, however, important to correctly classify such messages since
irony or sarcasm are commonplace in social media messages, and a wrong classification of such messages may
lead to false conclusions when interpreting social media user behavior.
4.1 Systematic approach for studying social media events
While the case study presented in this paper provides an in-depth analysis of the Twitter discussion surrounding
the 2016 Austrian presidential election, our approach for integrating sentiment analysis, network analysis, and
bot detection is generic and can be applied to a wide variety of social media events (see also Section 2.2). Figure
30 shows an UML activity diagram [Obj15] that visualizes the approach.
Data extraction phase: As in every data analysis process, a systematic data extraction procedure is
the first step for analyzing user behavior. In particular, this includes selecting appropriate tools and getting
acquainted with the corresponding APIs. Another important decision is choosing the topic-selectors (e.g. hash-
tags) for identifying and extracting relevant messages (e.g. tweets). For our case study we carefully selected
appropriate hashtags to focus the data extraction towards relevant tweets (see also Section 2).
Data pre-processing: After extracting the raw social media data, it is important to identify and remove
doubles. Moreover, we have to clean the data-set from misspellings and uninformative chunks of symbols (e.g.
HTML tags, URLs, or line breaks) which might interfere with subsequent analysis steps (see also Section 2).
After data cleaning and correction, one often performs first aggregation steps over the data. For example, in
our case study the usernames in tweets have been matched to usernames in the list of the candidates’ followers.
Data-set preparation: After the pre-processing steps are done, the data-set is ready for running prepara-
tory steps needed for the user behavior analysis. This typically includes the application of software tools for
deriving bot scores, sentiment scores, and emotion vectors from the pre-processed data-set. In particular,
for our case study we applied the SentiStrength algorithm [TBP+10] to obtain polarity scores and used the
NRC emotion-word lexicon [MT13] to identify the emotion vectors associated with the tweets in our data-set.
Moreover, we obtained bot scores by using the BotOrNot Python API [DVF+16].
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Figure 30: Generic approach for analyzing social media eventsa.
aActions with a green frame are related to sentiment analysis steps, actions with a blue frame are related to network analysis
steps, actions with a red frame are related to bot detection steps.
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Data analysis: Once the data-set is complete (including bot scores, sentiment scores, and emotion vectors),
we can start the actual data analysis. In particular, four different types of analyses are performed (see also
Figure 30):
• a quantitative data analysis to summarize the users’ communication behavior (e.g. the tweeting behavior)
in terms of the number of likes, replies, and endorsements (e.g. re-tweets);
• a sentiment analysis to identify sentiment polarities and emotions communicated by social media users
(e.g. the presidential candidates and their respective followers);
• a network analysis to study the communication patterns of social media users (e.g. via ego-networks of
important nodes such as the presidential candidates; and topic-networks, such as hashtag-networks, to
determine which topics are related to each other and/or associated with certain users).
• a bot analysis to identify automated software agents (social bots) that try to influence human users.
Moreover, for the analysis of the 2016 presidential election we also applied natural language processing
(NLP) techniques [Cho03, Sur13] to identify occurrences of negative campaigning.
4.2 Limitations
For our study the main restrictions result from the tools we used for data extraction, pre-processing, preparation,
and analysis (see Section 2.2). In particular, we used the Twitter API to extract publicly available tweets. One
significant limitation is an API restriction which only allows for the extraction of tweets that are at most seven
days old. Thus, if not planned properly, the data extraction cannot be repeated because the API restricts
access to tweets older than a week. Moreover, Twitter explicitly says that not all tweets are indexed or made
available by the Twitter API 24. Thus, even though we performed a systematic procedure where we extracted
the new tweets on a daily basis, we cannot rule out the possibility that we missed relevant tweets due to this
API restriction. In this context, it is important to mention though that the data-sets we extracted for the two
presidential candidates (@vanderbellen and @norbertghofer) are complete and include all tweets that have been
sent during the extraction period. We ensured this completeness by checking the tweets extracted via the API
and manually added tweets that were omitted by the Twitter API. However, it was infeasible to repeat the same
procedure for all tweets (i.e. all tweets of the candidates’ followers) since that would have meant to manually
check several ten-thousand user profiles on a daily basis.
A second limitation comes with the tools that we used for data analysis. In particular, we used the sentiment
analysis tool SentiStrength, the NRC emotion-word lexicon, and the BotOrNot Python API. Even though the
three tools have been used in numerous related studies (see e.g. [TBP+10, DVF+16, MT13, SDX13]), we cannot
exclude the possibility that some scores assigned by the tools are not appropriate. Thus, to mitigate such errors,
a prior assessment of the tools (e.g. by deploying human raters) could improve the overall correctness of the
assigned scores (see, e.g., [KCF+17]).
5 Related work
Over the past decade, a number of authors studied the diffusion of tweets in the context of political campaigns.
Many authors focus on a single type of analysis though. In contrast, the study presented in this paper provides
a multi-faceted analysis including sentiment analysis, social network analysis, and bot detection (see Section
4.1).
In [SDX13], Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan applied the SentiStrength algorithm for sentiment analysis to study the
spread of tweets during the German elections in 2012. In particular, they quantified the impact of positive and
negative tweets in terms of the re-tweet count and the speed of re-tweeting. In [DAORN12], Diaz-Aviles et al.
studied the public opinion about the presidents of 18 Latin American countries by applying sentiment analysis
techniques to Spanish language tweets and short blog posts. To determine how people feel about each president,
the authors carried out a part-of-speech tagging to extract the list of nouns and adjectives which they later
mapped to a corresponding emotion score in the NRC emotion lexicon. Additional non-English language studies
24https://dev.twitter.com/rest/reference/get/search/tweets
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have been conducted for the Nigerian presidential elections 2011 [FBP+13], Indonesian presidential elections
[GEE14], as well as the Bulgarian presidential elections [SKG+15].
Some studies combine sentiment analysis and social network analysis. For example, in [BCM+09] Berming-
ham et al. study jihadists’ radicalization over social networks. They took a lexicon-based approach to identify
sentiment polarities in YouTube comments and combined it with the network aspects of information sharing.
In particular, they applied betweenness centrality to identify influential users in the YouTube-sphere, analyzed
the network density, and determined the average communication speed. In another study Fornacciari et al.
[FMT15] examined the differences in opinions among Twitter communities by reconstructing a follower-followee
network of over 60 Twitter channels and assigning sentiment polarity scores to each vertex (user).
Some studies merely focused on the application of network analysis methods. For example, in [BB12]
Burgees and Bruns collected tweets about the 2010 Australian elections containing the #ausvotes hashtag. In
particular, they investigated the topics people tweeted about and reconstructed a network of replies. The authors
distinguished between a passive (broadcast only) and an interactive user behavior, and identified important users
in the network by applying the betweenness centrality measure. In [SKJ14], Song et al. applied a latent Dirichlet
allocation over a set of tweets to identify a list of topics discussed during the 2012 Korean presidential elections.
They examined the occurrences of each topic within a time period and categorized them as a rising (trending)
or a falling topic. In addition, they studied the topics related to each presidential candidate and constructed a
network of term co-occurrences.
In the light of recent events (such as the 2016 US presidential elections and the 2016 Brexit referendum),
numerous authors reported on the misuse of social media channels aiming to manipulate the voters’ opinions
(cf. [KK16, AAP17, HK16]). However, such a misuse has already been reported much earlier. For example, in
[RCM+11] Ratkiewicz et al. discuss the issue of political abuse by studying the spread of misinformation. The
authors consider mood scores based on Google’s Profile of Mood States (calm, alert, sure, vital, kind, happy)
(see [BM11]) and basic properties of the hashtag network and user-mention (i.e. @username) network topology
to automatically classify messages as truthful or fake. Another study by Jin et al. [JWZ+14] investigates the
characteristics of the spread of misinformation concerning Ebola by applying epidemiological modeling (see also
[BCAKCC06]). Moreover, in [HK16] Howard and Kollanyi report that bots have been used to amplify messages
by raising their re-tweet count in order to influence the 2016 Brexit referendum. Even though Howard and
Kollanyi identified only a small amount of bots participating in discussions about Brexit, those bots created a
comparatively large amount of the overall content (about one third of all messages).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an analysis of the Twitter discussions surrounding the 2016 Austrian presidential
elections. We extracted and analyzed 343645 German and English language Twitter messages that have been
posted by the two presidential candidates, their supporters, as well as other Twitter users. In particular, we
specified, documented, and applied a systematic approach for analyzing social media user behavior (see Sections
2 and 4.1). Our approach is generic and can be applied to perform similar analyses for a wide variety of other
social media events. Moreover our study combines sentiment analysis, network analysis, as well as bot detection.
Thereby, our paper complements previous approaches and case studies for analyzing social media user behavior
in large real-world events (cf. Section 5).
For the 2016 Austrian presidential election, we found that:
• with respect to our network analysis, the winner of the election (Alexander Van der Bellen) was consid-
erably more popular and influential on Twitter than his opponent;
• in their attempt to correct misinformation, the followers of Van der Bellen also substantially participated
in the spread of exactly that misinformation about him;
• there was a clear polarization in terms of the sentiments spread by Twitter followers of the two presidential
candidates;
• the in-degree and out-degree distributions of the underlying communication network are heavy-tailed;
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• compared to other recent events, such as the 2016 Brexit referendum or the 2016 US presidential elections,
only a very small number of bots participated in the Twitter discussion on the 2016 Austrian presidential
election.
In addition to the main findings summarized above, we also found that the two presidential candidates
showed a tendency to tweet shortly before and after important events (such as TV discussions) which confirms
previous findings from other elections [SKG+15]. However, aside from that we also identified increased social
media activity that did not correlate with the important events, but resulted from negative posts about a
candidate. Moreover, we found that candidates tend to engage predominantly in a one-to-many communication
pattern, and only occasionally respond directly to individual users.
By applying natural language processing (NLP) techniques, we found evidence that both candidates used
negative campaigning in order to get more supporters. In particular, our study distinguishes between mis-
information and negative information, and we found that negative information in this particular presidential
elections received a high re-tweet and like count. However, we also found evidence that the propagation of
misinformation can backfire and have negative effects on the spreader.
With respect to the tweeting behavior of the candidates’ followers, we used sentiment analysis and network
analysis techniques to construct ego-networks of the candidates, and examined which topics social media users
associate with each candidate. Our results show a clear distinction in how users perceive both candidates.
In particular, we found that hashtags carrying a negative connotation have predominantly been associated
with Norbert Hofer. This phenomenon can be observed in both, the English and German language hashtag
networks. Furthermore, in order to examine the communication patterns of social media users, we derived
the corresponding communication networks. For example, we applied network analysis techniques to identify
influential users in the German language network. In this context, we also showed that supporters of the two
candidates tend to form two distinct clusters and predominantly communicate within their group (which might
result in effects sometimes referred to as "filter bubble" or "echo chamber").
Similar to other technical infrastructures, social media platforms can be used for benign as well as malicious
purposes. In particular, information spread over social networks has the potential to endanger democracy,
disrupt markets, or manipulate people into joining radical groups [WEF13]. Thus, given the world-wide im-
portance of social media in information seeking and opinion sharing, studying the way information is being
disseminated over social media has become a field of significant economic, social, as well as technical impact.
As part of our future work, we intend to study the impact of different emotions on the spread of information
[KSCC17, KCF+17].
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